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Meeting with PFIAB
12 July 1984

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1982



CONFIDENTIAL

November 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Comments on Intelligence Matters (U)

The President has asked me to reaffirm the longstanding policy that we will not comment on intelligence matters. Efforts to clarify public reports of intelligence information, no matter how well intended, generally prove to be counterproductive. The resultant cycle can lead to the compromise of extremely sensitive information and grave damage to our national security. Exception to this policy can be granted only by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs based on the recommendation of the DCI. (C)

The President is determined that all officials of this government understand this policy clearly and comply with it fully. Please take appropriate steps to brief your subordinates and subordinate elements. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark



THE WHITE HOUSE

90318

WASHINGTON

Executive Registry

83-1128/1

March 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
 THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
 THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT
 DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE
 CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
 BOARD
 CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
 CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
 CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
 DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
 ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
 ADMINISTRATION
 ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

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NSDD 19

DCI
EXEC

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE

SUBJECT: NSDD-84: Safeguarding National Security Information

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on safeguarding national security information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall distribute copies of the Directive to any agency not listed above that originates or handles national security information.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment

NSDD-84

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

*National Security Decision
Directive Number 84*

Safeguarding National Security Information

As stated in Executive Order 12356, only that information whose disclosure would harm the national security interests of the United States may be classified. Every effort should be made to declassify information that no longer requires protection in the interest of national security.

At the same time, however, safeguarding against unlawful disclosures of properly classified information is a matter of grave concern and high priority for this Administration. In addition to the requirements set forth in Executive Order 12356, and based on the recommendations contained in the interdepartmental report forwarded by the Attorney General, I direct the following:

1. Each agency of the Executive Branch that originates or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures to safeguard against unlawful disclosures of classified information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide as follows:

a. All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access. This requirement may be implemented prospectively by agencies for which the administrative burden of compliance would otherwise be excessive.

b. All persons with authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to SCI and other classified information. All such agreements must include a provision for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.

c. All agreements required in paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. must be in a form determined by the Department of Justice to be enforceable in a civil action brought by the United States. The Director, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), shall develop standardized forms that satisfy these requirements.

d. Appropriate policies shall be adopted to govern contacts between media representatives and agency personnel, so as to reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate disclosures of classified information. All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be clearly apprised of the agency's policies in this regard.

2. Each agency of the Executive branch that originates or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures to govern the reporting and investigation of unauthorized disclosures of such information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide that:

a. All such disclosures that the agency considers to be seriously damaging to its mission and responsibilities shall be evaluated to ascertain the nature of the information disclosed and the extent to which it had been disseminated.

b. The agency shall conduct a preliminary internal investigation prior to or concurrently with seeking investigative assistance from other agencies.

c. The agency shall maintain records of disclosures so evaluated and investigated.

d. Agencies in the possession of classified information originating with another agency shall cooperate with the originating agency by conducting internal investigations of the unauthorized disclosure of such information.

e. Persons determined by the agency to have knowingly made such disclosures or to have refused cooperation with investigations of such unauthorized disclosures will be denied further access to classified information and subjected to other administrative sanctions as appropriate.


3. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information shall be reported to the Department of Justice and the Information Security Oversight Office, as required by statute and Executive orders. The Department of Justice shall continue to review reported unauthorized disclosures of classified information to determine whether FBI investigation is warranted. Interested departments and agencies shall be consulted in developing criteria for evaluating such matters and in determining which cases should receive investigative priority. The FBI is authorized to investigate such matters as constitute potential violations of federal criminal law, even though administrative sanctions may be sought instead of criminal prosecution.

4. Nothing in this directive is intended to modify or preclude interagency agreements between FBI and other criminal investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for conducting investigations within their own agencies or departments.

5. The Office of Personnel Management and all departments and agencies with employees having access to classified information are directed to revise existing regulations and policies, as necessary, so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph examinations, when appropriate, in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As a minimum, such regulations shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate

adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to cooperate with a polygraph examination that is limited in scope to the circumstances of the unauthorized disclosure under investigation. Agency regulations may provide that only the head of the agency, or his delegate, is empowered to order an employee to submit to a polygraph examination. Results of polygraph examinations should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information obtained during investigations.

6. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director, Office of Personnel Management, is requested to establish an interdepartmental group to study the federal personnel security program and recommend appropriate revisions in existing Executive orders, regulations, and guidelines.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 19

Protection of Classified National Security Council
and Intelligence Information

Unauthorized disclosure of classified information under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council and of classified intelligence reports is a problem of major proportions within the U.S. Government. The Constitution of the United States provides for the protection of individual rights and liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, but it also requires that government functions be discharged efficiently and effectively, especially where the national security is involved. As President of the United States, I am responsible for honoring both Constitutional requirements, and I intend to do so in a balanced and careful manner. I do not believe, however, that the Constitution entitles government employees, entrusted with confidential information critical to the functioning and effectiveness of the Government, to disclose such information with impunity. It is this is precisely the situation we have. It must not be allowed to continue.

To this end, I hereby establish and direct implementation of the following policies.

Contacts with the Media

All contacts with any element of the news media in which classified National Security Council matters or classified intelligence information are discussed will require the advance approval of a senior official. An administrative memorandum will be prepared as soon as possible after the contact, recording the subjects discussed and all information provided to the media representatives.

Access

The unauthorized disclosure of classified National Security Council information, documents, and deliberations requires further control to limit access and to ensure an accurate record of those who have had access. The number of officials with access to documents relating to NSC matters will be kept to the minimum essential to the orderly conduct of the government's business.


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Investigations

The government's lack of success in identifying the sources of unauthorized disclosure of classified National Security Council information and documents of classified intelligence information must be remedied and appropriate disciplinary measures taken. Henceforth, in the event of unauthorized disclosure of such information, government employees who have had access to that information will be subject to investigation, to include the use of all legal methods.

Applicability and Implementation

The provisions of this directive shall be effective immediately and shall apply to all employees of, and elements within, agencies participating in the National Security Council system, including the Executive Office of the President. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is directed to establish the detailed procedures to implement policies.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NSDD-19, attached, was issued in January 1982 to set guidelines for the protection of classified National Security Council and Intelligence Information. It's implementation was soft-pedaled after a strong media reaction. NSDD-19 was superseded by a memorandum signed by Judge Clark on 2 February 1982. It called for detailed procedures to implement policies and resulted in the issuance of NSDD-84.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DIRECTIVE NUMBER 19Protection of Classified National Security Council
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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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February 2, 1982

82-01058

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
THE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of
Classified National Security Council and
Intelligence Information

The President signed NSDD-19 on January 12, 1982, dealing with protection of classified National Security Council and Intelligence Information, directing that I establish procedures to implement its policy guidelines. This memorandum (1) supersedes NSDD-19, (2) establishes procedures for protection of National Security Council Information as herein defined, (3) directs agency heads to issue instructions in conformity with these procedures, (4) directs the Director of Central Intelligence to develop similar procedures for protection of classified intelligence information, and (5) requests the Attorney General to convene an interdepartmental group on the effectiveness of existing laws against unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

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UNCLASSIFIEDNational Security Council Information

National Security Council Information means classified information contained in: (1) any document prepared by or intended primarily for use by the NSC, its interagency groups as defined in NSDD-2, or its associated committees and groups, and (2) deliberations of the NSC, its interagency groups as defined in NSDD-2, or its associated committees and groups.

Access*NSC info only*

Any agency or department handling NSC Information will hold the number of persons having access to such information to the absolute minimum consistent with efficient operations of the NSC system, and will strictly control document dissemination and reproduction to carry out existing law. A numbered cover sheet bearing the notation appearing below will be affixed to each copy of a document containing NSC Information. The cover sheet will be attached at the time it is submitted to an Assistant Secretary or equivalent level. The NSC will provide sample cover sheets to departments and agencies who will then be responsible for further distribution and administration.

NOTICE

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

Implementation

Agency and department heads will forward to the NSC implementing instructions on these procedures no later than March 15, 1982.

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UNCLASSIFIED

② The PCI will also submit by that date for NSC consideration draft procedures for protection of sensitive intelligence information within its control. Such procedures will be cleared within the Intelligence Community and dissenting views will be noted.

③ The Attorney General is requested to convene by March 1, 1982, an interagency group to report to the President on the effectiveness of existing statutes and Executive Orders prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The report should be submitted by April 1, 1982.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

9 July 1984

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence

FROM: Acting Deputy Director for
Intelligence

We have had an opportunity to look at the draft PFIAB report on CIA and DIA estimates on Soviet Defense Spending. Some recommendations in the report are troublesome if not silly. We have provided to the PFIAB staff some general comments on their recommendations but, given the nature of their report, we doubt that the staff will change much.

In my view, it could create serious problems if the PFIAB report goes to the President without accompanying comments from you. When you meet with the PFIAB this Thursday, I recommend that you ask them to send you the report, as revised after their conversations with our officers, and agree to forward your comments on it to the President along with their report.

[Redacted Signature]

Richard J. Kerr

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DDI #03709-84

26 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Soviet Defense Costing Estimate

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1. I have pursued the question of a joint CIA/DIA estimate on Soviet defense spending to be issued in September or October. Let me describe the obstacle that I have discovered. People around town talk about CIA and DIA costing estimates as if they were two equally elaborate analytical efforts with equal validity based on the accumulation of intelligence data. Although it sounds parochial, the time has come to face reality: the comparison is not between apples and apples or apples and oranges but between an apple and a raisin.

- DIA's dollar effort on costing which is based on 150 of 300 weapons programs is based principally on projections, not data. For example, we will not do estimates on Soviet procurement for 1983 til 1985 because the data won't be available -- the work we are currently doing will be for 1982, just as last year's paper was on 1981.
- In their 1983 assessment, part of which was announced last month, they cite serial production of a follow-on to the SS-19 missile. There is absolutely no evidence to a follow-on to that missile in test much less that one is in serial production. So we have no idea where they get that.
- With respect to ruble costing or level of burden, you should understand that DIA simply extrapolates a straight line projection of one-third of the state budget from year to year.
- Moreover, there is no requirement inside DIA that the data of one assessment be internally consistent with that of another or even internally within the same estimate. The fact is we ended up having to help DIA understand what they themselves were doing.

DCI
EXEC
REG

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Cl By Signer

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2. Before we set in concrete how to approach this "common estimate" for this fall, I think you both need about 20 minutes from Doug MacEachin and [] not just on the methodological differences in approach between ourselves and DIA but, more importantly, the difference in the scope and sophistication of the effort. As indicated above, DIA is trying to put out figures on 1983; we are unprepared to do that because we do not have data in hand that would enable us to do it with any confidence much less high confidence. So right there is a major difference in approach on the costing estimate we are doing right now that will make this very difficult. []

25X1

25X1

3. I think all three of us probably wish this whole costing effort would just disappear because I don't know of a single substantive subject that breeds as much heartburn and as little positive return. Nevertheless, we have to deal with it and I think it is important that you be able to convey the difference in the effort as between CIA and DIA in a conversation with the Secretary. From my vantage point, and we can discuss it further when I return, a joint paper looks out of the question. Separate papers are a possibility but we have such great uncertainties about projections that are less than a year old that we would prefer only to do 1982 rather than 1983. I am asking Dick Kerr to set up a meeting between the two of you and the two from SOVA so that you can hear some of this first-hand and get a better appreciation of the problem. It is more than just a difference in numbers between the two agencies. []

25X1



Robert M. Gates

SECRET

DDI #03709-84

26 June 1984

SUBJECT: Soviet Defense Costing Estimate

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

11 July 1984

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Acting Deputy Director for
Intelligence

Attached are SOVA comments on the Pipes evaluation of the analysis of Soviet Politics. I agree with much of the comments by SOVA. Pipes is off-base on Poland and succession, but it is hard to argue with some of his conclusions and recommendations. We do need to improve the integration of our political, military, and economic analysis. We do have some blinders and biases when it comes to political analysis of Soviet intentions. While we are working on some of these issues, they have not been solved and we do not want to go back to PFIAB suggesting that our Soviet analysis is in wonderful shape.

I suggest that you acknowledge problems in this area but indicate that the reorganization, management awareness, and an attempt to upgrade personnel are efforts now underway.

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